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TOWARDS PRINCIPLED SENTENCING*
NORVAL MORRIS**

Recently I have been advised of the three great lies: "Thank you
for reminding me, the check is in the mail"; "I'm sorry, I gave at the
office"; and "I'm from the Government and I have come to help
you."
Government is not always beneficent, your response tells me.
Nor is the wish to do social good always the immediate prelude to its
achievement. Nowhere are these truths more evident than in the
governmental task of sentencing convicted criminals, a task to
which I wish to direct your attention today. So much seems to be
expected of the criminal sentence: crime reduction, deterrence
coupled with clemency, a deserved punishment linked to that
insightful individualization of punishment which fosters selfregeneration.
The sentencing decision is complex, difficult, and of fundamental importance; yet we lack a common law of sentencing. The
purposes to be achieved by sentencing are not agreed upon, nor are
our procedures. A mixture of motives has led us astray: on one hand,
an exaggerated belief in the deterrent efficacy of punishments; on
the other, an excessive faith in the possibility of coercively
transforming the criminal into a law-abiding citizen. Both deterrence and reform have failed us: deterrence, because our limited
capacity to catch, convict, and sentence the guilty fails to fulfill the
threat of punishment; reform, because coercive reform is no business
of the criminal law. When the criminal law enters that business it
tends to corrupt its legitimate purposes, achieving neither justice nor
social protection.
It is obvious that I am not going to solve these mysteries today.
Some of man's earliest writings deal with the proper equation
between crime and punishment; the subsequent literature is
enormous; no transcendent truths will emerge today. But it may be
possible, at a time of ferment in sentencing reform, to offer some
ideas relevant to legislative, judicial, and academic discussions of
the various current proposals for sentencing reform - that,
certainly, is my purpose.
* This is, with minor changes, the Morris Ames Soper Lecture for 1977 given at
the University of Maryland School of Law on March 10, 1977.
** Dean and Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of
Chicago. LL.B., 1946; LL.M., 1947, University of Melbourne; Ph.D., 1949, London
University.

(267)

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

The first insight I submit for your consideration is that
sentencing reform is unlikely substantially to reduce crime or
juvenile delinquency. The press and its willing acolytes, the
politicians, frequently promise substantial diminution of crime and
juvenile delinquency through manipulation of court procedures and
a hardening of sentencing practice. Be not deceived. There is much
wrong with the American criminal justice system but its leading
defect is not, as the tabloids suggest, the sentimentality of the
judiciary. In many days' marches through the criminal courts of this
country, I have found few bleeding-hearted judges; they tend, in
terms of physiognomy, to the prognathous jaw and the hard nose,
far from characteristic of the sentimental softies the press describes.
The allegation of too lenient sentencing by the judge is an
irrelevancy, a distraction from the systemic difficulties that beset
sentencing practice, particularly in the crowded urban courts of this
country.
The public has been led to expect too much of the criminal
justice system generally and grossly too much from sentencing
reform. The criminal justice system controls the largest power the
government exercises over its citizens and is of central constitutional
importance, but its reform, if consonant with a due respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, will make no more than
relatively small differences in the incidence of crime and juvenile
delinquency. These phenomena respond to deep social, cultural, and
political currents beyond the substantial influence of the criminal
justice system. The system cannot itself rectify social inequities; but
it certainly should not exacerbate them, as it does now. The system
cannot end the poverty that persists amidst conspicuous plenty, it
cannot abolish racial discrimination in a country dedicated to the
equality of man, it cannot solve the diverse problems of our
criminogenic society. Does that mean that sentencing reform is
unimportant? Not at all. It is of crucial importance. All that I am
struggling to refute are those unrealistic expectations which have
long blighted criminal law reform. Let me try to be clear about what
can reasonably be expected of sentencing reform: first what cannot
and then what can be expected.
The shadow that crime now casts across the face of America is
unlikely to be much reduced until, in the 1980's, changes in the age
and distribution of our population give us surcease. We have
gathered together our minority, ill-educated youth, underemployed
and vocationally untrained, in pockets of desolation in our larger
cities. Welfare programs have contributed to the breakdown of the
families of the poor and have helped make criminals of their
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children. A drug culture powers crime in the ghetto. A plague of
handguns has turned domestic conflicts into gun battles and has
eased the path of the socially pressured towards street crime. Crime
in the suites gives moral leadership to crime in the streets. A
multiplicity of police forces burdened by excessive minor service and
regulatory duties achieves exiguous clearance rates of crime. The
jails, the courts, and the prisons are overcrowded: in particular,
the prison population swells in its inadequate and ancient premises.
It is most unlikely that sentencing reform will make a substantial
inroad on these criminogenic realities.
Let me give an example. Van Dine, Dinitz and Conrad have
recently conducted an experiment1 to test statistically whether
mandatory incapacitative sentences - as advocated by Wilson, Van
den Haag and others 2 - would substantially reduce violent crimes.
The most stringent option they tested, a five year net mandatory
term for any adult convicted of a felony, would have reduced crime
in the area studied by only four percent. Such a sentencing system
would, of course, be nullified and modified in practice, and the payoff
would be even less. 3 And more realistic, less draconic, mandatory
sentences are likely, I shall argue, to have even less effect on the
crime rate.
What, then, can sentencing reform achieve? The journey will not
be short nor the results easy of achievement but, in my view, we can
reasonably expect a small but measurable reduction of crime and
juvenile delinquency and, at least equally important, the emergence
of a principled, evenhanded, effective yet merciful common law of
sentencing, consistent with human rights and just freedoms,
competent to deter crime, outline minimum behavioral standards,
and better protect society against its ingroup predators.
I hope, by what the diplomats affectedly call a tour d'horizon, to
throw some light on certain key issues in the emergence of such a
common law of sentencing. But there yet remain a few necessary
preliminary points.
There are at least two aspects to the emergence of a principled
jurisprudence of sentencing: purposive and procedural. The
purposes of punishment are too often considered apart from the
machinery of their achievement, and the awkward squalor of reality
thus banished. Though artificial isolation of a topic is often
necessary for its elucidation, in this instance principle and procedure
1. Van Dine, Dinitz & Conrad, The Incapacitationof the Dangerous Offender: A
Statistical Experiment, 14 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ. 22 (1977).
2. See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD

A. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 198-209 (1975).
3. The deterrent efficacy of such sentences was, of course, not measured.

AND PAINFUL QUESTION (1975);
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are so deeply intertwined that our only hope of moving towards
principled sentencing lies in new procedures and, in particular, in
the better control of charge and plea bargaining and the wiser
distribution and control of sentencing discretion between the
legislature, the judge, and the administrator than now obtain. A new
procedural synthesis is essential to principled sentencing. I know
this is an opaque affirmation; I hope to move towards some clarity
as this lecture grinds relentlessly on.
In a relatively recent book, 4 I tried to isolate sentencing purposes
from sentencing procedures and offered an answer to the question
"Why should a convicted criminal be imprisoned?"; this seemed to
me a practical way to contribute to a jurisprudence of sentencing. I
suggested two guiding principles: the principle of parsimony,
whereby the least restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to achieve
defined social purposes should be imposed; and the principle of
desert, whereby no sanction should be imposed greater than that
which is "deserved" by the crime, or series of crimes, for which the
offender is being sentenced. And I advanced dogmatic views on the
proper application of special and general deterrence and on
predictions of future dangerousness in the imposition of punishments. These issues are important and relevant to the emergence of
a common law of sentencing, but I prefer not further to discuss them
with you today; I shall instead focus on their relationship to
sentencing procedures and, in particular, to the questions of who
should impose sentence on the criminal and under what legislative,
judicial, and administrative limitations.
One of the compelling reasons for this necessary synthesis of
purpose and procedure is the diversity of crime. Punitive purposes
appropriate to homicide are less relevant to petty larcency; certainly
the mixes of purposes to be achieved are different. Incest, drunken
driving, bank robbery, and embezzlement present substantially
different social problems which are unlikely to be effectively
addressed by any simple hierarchy of punishment aims. The
necessary operative complexity will have to be found in sentencing
processes capable of mediating those differences.
And further, discretion in punishment, an inevitably necessary
element as we shall see, 5 may properly be differently exercised at
different levels of the criminal justice system. Given that a
prosecutor exercises a sentencing discretion in his decision to accept
a plea of guilty to a lesser charge than that for which he might
4. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
5. See, e.g., p. 282-83 infra.

IMPRISONMENT

(1974).
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possibly obtain a conviction, his discretion to do so is properly less
circumscribed than that of a judge imposing sentence after a jury
trial and conviction. The latter is more public: the deterrent and
educative functions of the criminal law weigh more heavily. Hence
we face problems not only of the proper ends of punishment but also
of the appropriate distribution of punitive discretion.
Finally, before a series of current sentencing problems is listed
and commented upon, let me address the question why sentencing
has now caught the public eye. The books on sentencing6 flow to
such an extent that my brilliant colleague, Franklin Zimring, has
been moved to publish "A Consumers' Guide to Sentencing
Reform."' The legislative proposals and reforms multiply, from
California 8 to Maine.9 Statutory sentencing reform is in the wind,
and Congress now girds itself for the consideration of at least two
important reform initiatives, the Kennedy Bill 10 and the Hart-Javits
Bill." Why the flurry? Why the present ferment? Many reasons, I
suppose, but one in particular merits present comment.
A false dichotomy long concealed the tensions in sentencing
policy which have now become manifest. We long conducted the
debate in polar terms. One was either for punishment and deterrence
or one was for treatment and reform. In those simplistic days, before
we recognized the inadequacies in our rehabilitative and reform
models of the criminal process, the diversity in sentencing, the
disparities in the treatment of apparently like cases, was explained
either by the incompetence or inefficiency of the judiciary in properly
individualizing punishment to adjust the needs of social defense to
the rehabilitation of the offender. Francis Allen's essay on the
rehabilitative ideal' 2 attracted enormous support. In the same year
that Allen's book of essays was published, 1964, I found that I was
arguing that "power over a criminal's life should not be taken in
excess of that which would be taken were his reform not considered
as one of our purposes."' 3 In 1964 that was not an obvious
6. E.g., D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR
CORRECTIONS (1975); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976).
7. F. ZIMRING, MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: A COMSUMERS' GUIDE
TO SENTENCING REFORM (1977).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.0-1170.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).

9. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151-1156, 1201-1206, 1251-1254,
1301-1305 (Supp. 1975).
10. S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 406 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977).
11. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 556 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1977).
12. F. ALLEN, Legal Values and the RehabilitativeIdeal, in THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 25 (1964).
13. N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STUDIES IN CRIMIINAL LAW 175 (1964).
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proposition. It can hardly be argued against now. Many studies and
a legion of commentators, culminating perhaps in the overstatement
of Martinson's swiftly accepted view that "nothing works"'1 4 have
forced reconsideration of the traditional polar argument between the
punishers and the treaters.
The problems of just sentencing are now seen to be more
complex; the pervasive unjust disparity of sentencing more difficult
of remedy. Suggestions of a simple balance between encompassed
harm and deserved punishment receive widespread support; though
they too, as I shall argue, misleadingly simplify the problem and will
not achieve the larger equities at which we aim. The balance
between desert, deterrence, the educative effects of punishment on
the community, a due respect for human rights and minimum
dignities, the lasting constraints of clemency and charity, and the
existing and likely continuing inadequacies of our understanding of
man and his place in society, the whole compounded by the great
diversity of crime and the paucity of resources we allocate to its just
control, make up a problem insoluble by simplistic solutions like
mandatory minimum sentences or legislatively fixed sentences. And
all this complexity is, in my view, pressing on us now for two
reasons: an increasing recognition of the serious impact crime has
on life in this country, and a clearer perception that the criminal law
is an unlikely engine for coercing man to the good life or for coercing
the criminal to social conformity.
Certain key issues in sentencing reform which I now wish to list
and then briefly comment upon are:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Disparity, Individualization, and Equality;
Parole and its Doubtful Future;
Legislatively Fixed Terms
a. Mandatory Mimimum Sentences,
b. The Fogel Plan,
c. Presumptive Sentences: The Hart-Javits Bill;
Distributing Sentencing Discretion: The Kennedy Bill.

1.

Disparity,Individualization, and Equality

I find myself in a retrospective mood. Twenty-five years ago I
presented a paper at a law convention in which I argued that there
were gross and unjust variations in sentences imposed on convicted
criminals, variations explicable neither by the severity of the crime
14. Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
22 (1974). See also D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE

THE PUBLIC INTEREST
EFFECTIVENESS
EVALUATION

OF

STUDIES

CORRECTIONAL

(1975).

TREATMENT:

A

SURVEY

OF

TREATMENT

1977]

TOWARDS PRINCIPLED SENTENCING

nor by the criminal record or personality of the criminal. 15 The
astonishingly swift passage of the years has not shaken my faith in
this conclusion; the data on unjust sentencing disparity have indeed
become quite overwhelming and will, I submit, convince anyone who
will take the time to study them. Let me draw your attention to just a
few recent studies illustrative of both judicial and parole board
disparity in sentencing.
In a recent experiment in the Federal Second Circuit,' 6 all fortythree of the active federal trial judges in that circuit and seven senior
trial judges rendered sentences on twenty identical cases set forth in
presentence reports. 17 There was a wide range of disagreement
among the judges regarding appropriate sentences for identical
cases. For example, in one case the sentences varied from three to
twenty years, and in another from probation to seven and one-half
years. Furthermore, even after eliminating the extremes of the
distribution, substantial disagreement persisted. Absence of consensus was found to be the norm.
In a study of sentencing councils, Diamond and Zeisel found
that such councils have a relatively small effect on the very large
disparity present in the system.' 8 Sentencing councils attempt to
reduce sentencing disparity by requiring each judge to discuss with
his fellow judges the cases on which he is to pass sentence. Before
the council discussion, disparity averaged around forty-five percent
of the mean severity of sentence in the Eastern District of New York
and about thirty-seven percent in the Northern District of Illinois;
the disparity reduction effected by the councils was only about four
percent.
In a recent study of sentences in federal courts throughout the
country, Tiffany, Avichai and Peters found substantial variation in
sentences that related to such apparently unprincipled factors as:
type of trial - whether by bench or jury;
type of counsel - whether retained or appointed (but only in
bench trials);
race of defendant (but only where defendant had no prior
record).19
15. Morris, Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 AUSTL. L. J. 186 (1953).
16. A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A
REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974).
17. Each presentence report contained information regarding the crime, whether
the guilty verdict followed a plea or trial, prior record, age, narcotic history, family
background, etc.
18. Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and
Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975).
19. Tiffany, Avichai & Peters, A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal
Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial, 1967-68, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (1975).
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The discovery of such unprincipled disparity took many students
of the criminal justice system by surprise, but, in retrospect, it should
not have. Sentencing in America has not been guided by any
apparent principles, and certainly not by legislatively enunciated
principles. It has been left to the caprices of judges with various
characters and training, working under pressures of crowded court
dockets, and to the vagaries of changing judicial and public attitudes
towards crime and punishment. No considered or routine procedure
guides the imposition of sentence, nor have generally accepted
criteria been established. The judge need not give reasons for his
decision nor explain it to the convicted criminal.
Because disparity flows from lack of principle and absence of
modulating procedures, one wonders if perhaps the individualized
attentions of parole boards can achieve a larger equity. But parole
boards are even less constrained than judges by controlling
principles or procedures. Studies similar to the judicial sentencing
studies discussed above have found unjust disparity also in the
decision to release on parole. 2°
It is important to understand that these sentencing studies try to
hold constant those individual qualities, both in the criminal and his
social setting, which are thought to justify individualization of
punishment and thus to explain its variation from the norm. Several
decades of research seem to me to have clearly demonstrated not the
existence of sentencing disparity possibly justified by the needs of
individualized sentencing, but rather the existence of gross sentencing disparity not capable of being so justified.
The currently fashionable leap to the automatic equality of fixed
term sentencing, the sentence determined by the severity of the
crime and modulated only slightly by defined aggravating and
mitigating circumstances found by the judge to influence the
deserved punishment, is clearly understandable as a pendulum
reaction to our long-prevailing sentencing anarchy. But it is, I
believe, a mistake; and for two reasons. First, as will be seen when
we discuss legislatively fixed term sentencing, such systems are
incapable of encompassing the subtleties of crime-to-criminal
relationships essential to just sentencing. Secondly, equality in
punishment is not an absolute principle; it is a value to be weighed
and considered among other values, no more; and there can be just
21
sentences in which like criminals are not treated alike.
20. E.g., Heinz, Heinz, Senderowitz & Vance, Sentencing by Parole Board: An
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1976).
21. This is a long argument which I have developed elsewhere at burdensome
length, N. Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in (7) EQUAL JUSTICE

Evaluation, 67 J.
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What it comes to is this: the fine tuning of just and efficient
sentencing cannot be done by the legislature. The judge is the
inevitably appropriate sentencing figure in the drama of crime and
punishment.
What remain to be considered for the rest of this lecture are the
sentencing judge's relationships with the legislature, the parole
board, the proposed Commission on Sentencing, and the appellate
court.
In my view, the rational division of power between legislature
and judge was laid out in the mid-1950's by the American Law
Institute in its Model Penal Code: 22 it defines the path to a common
law of sentencing. The several proposals for a Federal Criminal
Code, 23 the American Bar Association's Committee on Sentencing in
its Standards Project, 24 and a number of recently proposed and
legislatively accepted state criminal codes 25 are building on the
American Law Institute's initiative and can increasingly give a
rational frame of reference to the judge in his difficult task of
punishing the convicted criminal. These codes reduce the number of
categories of felonies and misdemeanors, 26 set the maximum
punishment applicable to each, and guide the judge in the criteria
that he is to apply in fixing the proper term of imprisonment within
the discretion statutorily given to him. To continue this evolution
towards a common law of sentencing, it should increasingly be
required that the judge give reasons for his choice of sentence and
that his sentences, and thus his reasons, be subject to appellate
review. Principled sentencing lies at the heart of an effective
criminal justice system. It is obvious that sentencing involves a
heavy responsibility and raises issues of difficulty; it thus requires
LAW, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BICENTENNIAL LECTURE SERIES 136
(1977), and which I will only summarize dogmatically now.
22. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.01 to .13, 7.01 to .09 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954), later
incorporated in MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.01 to .13, 7.01 to .09 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
23. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 6833 (daily ed. May 2, 1977); S.
1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 211 (1975); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119
CONG. REC. 9634 (1973); S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 92 (1973); H.R.
10047, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 28464 (1973).
UNDER

24. ABA

STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES

(Tent. Draft 1967).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.0-1170.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151-1156, 1201-1206, 1251-1254, 1301-1305 (Supp. 1975); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 161.605 to .685, 161.705 to .735.
26. A discussion of the different systems of offense classification adopted by
states as well as those contained in proposed state criminal codes, the MODEL PENAL
CODE, and the MODEL SENTENCING ACT can be found in Low, Preliminary
Memorandum on Sentencing Structure in 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWs, WORKING PAPERS, 1245, 1258-65 (1970).
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reasons given, critical public consideration of those reasons, critical
appellate review of those reasons: in short, a system of precedent
leading to principled justice under law.
In a recent proposal by the Department of Justice, the abolition
of the Parole Board was recommended, its place to be taken by a
Commission on Sentencing operating before, not after, the judicial
imposition of sentence. 27 The Commission on Sentencing would
function between the legislative promulgation of maximum and
minimum punishments for each category of offense and the judicial
imposition of sentence on each offender. The Commission would
gather data on the efficacy of sentencing, provide information
services to the judiciary, define recommended ranges of punishment
for the diverse categories of offense-offender relationships, publish
guidelines to sentencing, and enunciate principles of sentencing. The
various proposals for such a Commission on Sentencing differ in
their division of power between the Commission, the legislature, and
the judiciary; the broad plan seems highly promising.
2. Parole and Its Doubtful Future
An important current division of sentencing power, in the
federal system and in most states, is the division of power between
the judge and the parole board in fixing the prison term which is in
fact served. There is, at present, a strong movement for the abolition
of the parole system. This would not necessarily mean the abolition
of aftercare control and support of the released prisoner, which can
be imposed and provided whether or not the parole board is retained;
but it would put a stop to the sharing of power between the judiciary
and the parole board in the determination of the date of the
prisoner's release.
I favor the abolition of parole. Let me summarize my reasons by
criticizing each of the six grounds which have been offered in
support of a releasing discretion exercised by a parole board. It has
been suggested that the parole board rather than the judge should
fix the release date because the board can:
1. find the optimum moment for release;
2. provide an incentive for the prisoner's rehabilitation;
3. facilitate prison control and discipline;
4. share sentencing responsibility to maximize deterrence while
reducing time served;
5. control the size of the prison population; and
6. rectify unjust disparities in sentencing.
27. Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws: Hearings on S. 1437, S. 31, S. 45, S. 181,
S. 204, S. 260, S. 888, S. 979, and S. 1221 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and
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Again, the refutation of each of these suggestions is long, and in this
lecture dogmatic rejections will have to suffice; but all six fail.
The first claimed justification of parole, prediction of the
optimum moment for release, fails empirically. Protracted empirical
analysis has demonstrated that predictions of recidivism are no
more likely to be accurate when made on the date of release than
when made early in the prison term. Behavior in the cage is no guide
at all to behavior in the community.
The second justification for the parole discretion - to provide an
incentive for the prisoner's rehabilitation - has as its net effect the
reliance on compulsory rehabilitation in the prison setting. The
problem is that this type of coerced curing of crime does not work,
except in turning prisons into schools of drama and hyprocrisy. In
practice, this parole incentive results in a waste of limited resources
which could be far better used to provide treatment opportunities for
prisoners who volunteer for them, uncoerced by the overwhelming
pressure to try to induce a favorable parole decision. It is ludicrous to
fill our limited prison treatment resources with other than volunteers.
The third justification - to facilitate prison control and
discipline - is in fact an important latent pragmatic justification for
parole. But it is vulnerable to attack on grounds of injustice. If the
prisoner commits a crime while in prison, there are no grounds for
excluding the writ of the criminal law from the prison: the prisoner
should be charged and further punished. For disciplinary control of
misbehavior in prison short of crime, or where the invocation of the
criminal sanction would be excessive or inappropriate, disciplinary
sanctions are appropriate under the control of whatever due process
administrative hearings the prison authorities may provide. The
deprivation of "good time" - time off for conformity to prison rules
- may be a power necessary for such an administrative tribunal to
possess, but it is certainly irrelevant to the parole decision.
Depriving a prisoner of "good time" as punishment for a disciplinary breach and then adding the further punishment of deferment of
parole release because of the same misbehavior is an unjust double
penalty. Prison misbehavior does not predict misbehavior in the
community and achieving conformity to prison discipline is no
business of the parole board.
The fourth claimed justification for parole discretion - that
sharing sentencing responsibility between the court and the parole
board maximizes deterrence - reflects the tendency in our criminal
Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9200 (Part XIII)
(1977).
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justice system to prefer words to deeds in sentencing. Parole allows
for judicial announcement of punishments larger than are in fact
carried out. The thought is, apparently, thus to maximize deterrence
while reducing the suffering from the punishment actually applied.
For a few years this charade may have gone unnoticed, but by now
every judge knows the practice, as does the public. Judges who wish
to punish severely simply inflate their sentences to counteract
anticipated deflation by the parole board. No one is deceived, but
under the vagaries of parole decisions subject to diffuse political and
public pressures some prisoners will suffer randomly, or worse,
discriminatorily, to no social gain.
The fifth justification sometimes offered for the retention of the
parole discretion is that it facilitates control of the size of the prison
population: if the prisons are overcrowded, more prisoners can be
paroled to make room for the influx. Pragmatism at this level lays
bare our tolerance of unprincipled sentencing; it is clearly unjust for
the duration of detention of one criminal to turn on the behavior of
other criminals. And, in fact, parole boards are very reluctant to act
in this way; they often tend to defer release at times of prison
overcrowding. Parole boards are sensitive to public and political
attitudes. They aim to achieve high "success rates" where success is
measured by their definition of a "failure": the commission of a
crime while the ex-prisoner is on parole. Hence the longer they defer
the prisoner's release the less their risk of a failure. The result is
that, in times of increasing crime, increasing public and political
anxieties about crime, and expanding prison populations - such as
we have been experiencing in recent years - the strong tendency of
parole boards is to minimize risks on parole, to defer release, to
compound and not to cure the problem of prison overcrowding.
The sixth and last claimed justification of the parole discretion
is that it can be used to rectify unjust disparities in judicial
sentencing. Let me give some examples. Crime for crime and
criminal for criminal, sentences imposed by courts in Chiago tend to
be substantially less severe than those imposed in the rural southern
regions of Illinois. The Illinois Parole Board sees itself, in the
exercise of its parole discretion, as having a duty to apply its release
decisions so as to minimize these disparities. Similar disparities are
to be readily found between different federal judicial circuits and the
Federal Parole Board likewise sees one of its functions as achieving
a regression towards the mean.
Given the need to minimize this disparity, the question is
whether parole boards are the best mechanisms with which to do so.
If there is a significantly more effective and sensible way to deal
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with sentencing disparity, as I believe there is, this last justification
fails: parole boards are not needed.
We see, therefore, that the case for preservation of the parole
release discretion fails, but sometimes institutions outlive their
rationales. And if this is so in the case of parole boards, there is
much to be said for all parole boards following the path now being
tentatively pursued by the Federal Parole Board and deciding
release dates, subject to the prisoner's good behavior, quite soon
after the prison sentence begins.28 The federal board's use of a
"salient factor" score and of more open criteria to guide its discretion
29
also tend in the right direction towards principled sentencing.
3.

Legislatively Fixed Terms:

a) Mandatory Minimum Sentences
One simplistic response to the alleged sentimental leniency of
the judiciary and the anarchy of sentencing disparity is the
advocacy of mandatory minimum sentences. There is, indeed, little
doubt of the political attractiveness of such proposals, and
politicians seem even more susceptible than the rest of us to earning
a cheap popularity.
Mandatory minimum sentences, fixed terms or fixed minimum
terms for defined crimes, are the most extreme form of legislative
limitation of judicial discretion. A popular example is the minimum
five year sentence for anyone convicted of carrying a gun at the time
of the commission of a felony. Legislation of this kind is unprincipled and morally insensible: it cannot encompass the factual and
moral distinctions between crimes essential to a just and rational
sentencing policy.
Nevertheless, recently it has become politically fashionable to
demand the imposition of such stringent limits upon sentencing
discretion, and in many jurisdictions statutory provisions for
mandatory sentencing have already been adopted. In practice, such
provisions have always met with non-enforcement and nullification.
This is neither surprising nor deplorable. It is not surprising because
the pervasive influence of plea bargaining inevitably ensures the
reduction of charges for offenses carrying severe mandatory
penalties. It is not deplorable because persistent confusion about the
goals of criminal law enforcement and indefiniteness regarding the
purposes of punishment make sentencing discretion essential. The
28. See N. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 31-50.
29. L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON,
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enforcement of arbitrary penal equations is both irrational and
inequitable.
In fact, the attempt to eliminate sentencing discretion results in
its being transferred from the judge to the prosecutor, who exercises
such discretion in the process of charge and plea negotiation. In an
overcrowded court system, it is as though discretion were like matter,
the quantity of which Helmholtz described as "eternal and
unalterable": it cannot be destroyed, it can only be displaced.
Professor Remington reports:
In Detroit during the 1950's, state statutes prohibited probation
for burglary in the nighttime and imposed a significant,
mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery. In practice,
. . .burglaries committed after dark resulted in pleas to daytime
burglary, and .. .robberies committed with a gun ended up as
pleas of guilty to unarmed robbery. So common was the practice
that the Michigan parole board would often start the interview
with "I see you were convicted of unarmed robbery in Detroit.
What caliber of gun did you use?" Without even a smile, the
'30
inmate would respond "a .38 caliber revolver.
b)

The Fogel Plan

One group of reformers, of whom David Fogel is a principal
spokesman, advocates legislatively fixed term sentences, the
legislature prescribing precisely what sentence the judge must
impose for any given offense proved before him, allowing him only a
relatively small margin to vary the sentence because of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances of the offense or of the offender. 31 In
32
several states, legislation of this nature is under consideration. It
has thus far been adopted in none and I have come to the view that
it should be adopted in none. It is impossible for legislatures to
define in advance, at least in relation to any existing definitions of
crimes, sentences that are just and appropriate. The best that can be
done is to phrase the range from the least socially tolerable sanction
to the maximum deserved punishment. Legislatively fixed terms
preclude that fine tuning of punishment to relate it to the severity of
30. Remington, Book Review, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (1976).
31. See D. FOGEL, supra note 6; McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, Illinois
Reconsiders "Flat Time". An Analysis of the Impact of the Justice Model, 52 CHI.KENT L. REV. 621 (1976).
32. This was true at the time these words were spoken; subsequently, at least two
states passed legislation that may be thought of as modified Fogel Plans. See Ill. Pub.
Act 80-1099, 1977 Ill. Laws; IND. CODE ANN. tit. 35, art. 50 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1977).
The sentencing hierarchies established by these codes, however, still leave more
discretion in the judge than would a true Fogel Plan.
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the offense and the moral gravity of the crime which is essential to
justice and which can be achieved only by the judge.
The Fogel-type plan suffers from the same problem as besets
mandatory minimum sentencing. It presupposes that if judicial
sentencing discretion is limited, all sentencing discretion will be
limited, whereas, in practice, there is likely to be little effect on the
prosecutor's discretion concerning charge setting, charge bargaining, and plea bargaining which give life to sentencing practice. Few
are in prison for what they have done: most are in for what they
have pleaded guilty to, which is substantially less. Legislatively
fixed terms will not change this.
c) Presumptive Sentences: The Hart-JavitsBill
Recommendations somewhat similar to the legislatively fixed
sentences we have considered are offered by Andrew von Hirsch;33
a more sophisticated plan is developed in the Report of the
Twentieth Century Fund, 34 in which Professor Dershowitz has been
influential. Their recommendations have similar thrusts, seeking to
control judicial discretion by precise legislative statements of the
appropriate or "presumptive" sentence.
Senators Hart and Javits have introduced to Congress a
35
complex bill called "The Federal Sentencing Standards Act,"

which seeks to restructure sentencing procedures in the federal
system on the basis of the recommendations of von Hirsch and
Dershowitz. 36 The bill would require the sentencing judge to impose
on any convict the presumptive sentence, a "definite and specific
penalty" assigned to his offense by the Federal Sentencing
Commission created by the bill. Variation from the presumptive
sentence based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances
would also be allowed, but only as provided for by the rules of the
37
Commission.
The Hart-Javits Bill thus introduces a new power into the
sentencing process, an administrative tribunal to mediate between
the legislature and the judiciary. Given the difficillty of legislative
definition of sentences there is much to be said for this proposal
which is further and, in my view, better developed in the Kennedy
Bill considered hereunder.
33. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 6.
34. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
35. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 556 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1977).
36. See 123 CONG. REC. 554-55 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
37. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a)(1), 123 CONG. REC. 557 (daily ed. Jan. 12,
1977).
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The Hart-Javits Bill makes detailed provisions concerning the
work of the Sentencing Commission and how it should define and
express presumptive sentences. 38 The sentencing judge would have
only a small role in developing sentencing doctrine, but the judge
would have the power to vary the presumptive sentence to the extent
allowed by the relevant Commission rules. Any such variation from
the presumptive sentence must be justified by the judge on the
record, including a description of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances and other information, evidence, or factors upon
which he relied. 39 The bill also provides that the United States
Parole Board shall have no power to grant parole to prisoners
40
sentenced under these presumptive sentence processes.
It is an interesting proposal, striking a different balance
between legislature and judiciary than at present exists and having
the potential, depending on the quality of the work of the
Commission, to reduce somewhat the present sentencing disparity
and inequity; but it also has stunning defects. It leaves, I suggest,
too little discretion in the hands of the sentencing judge, and I am
extremely skeptical of the ability of any sentencing commission to
minimize this defect.
My colleague, Franklin Zimring, in the consumer survey to
which I earlier made reference, 41 cogently developed a criticism of
presumptive sentencing under four headings, the most compelling of
which he called "The Incoherence of the Criminal Law." A few
extracts from his argument will make the point:Any system of punishment that attaches a single sanction to a
particular offense must define offenses with a morally persuasive precision that present laws do not possess. .

.

. [W]e lack

the capacity to define into formal law the nuances of situation,
intent and social harm that condition the seriousness of
42
particular criminal acts.
What it amounts to is that if justice is to be achieved, these nuances
must not be systematically ignored. Only the sentencing judge can,
in the last resort, give them proper weight. He must be given greater
flexibility for principled variation of sentence than any list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances varying a presumptive
sentence can provide. The world of rational and just sentencing is
38. See id. §§6-10.
39. Id. § 12(a)(2).
40. Id. § 11(b).

41. F.

ZIMRING,

42. Id. at 10.

supra note 7, at 10-15.
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too complicated for such rigid and simple methods of assessing
moral gravity and social utility.
4.

Distributing Sentencing Discretion: The Kennedy Bill

To oppose mandatory minimum sentences, legislatively fixed
sentences, and administratively defined presumptive sentences is
not to oppose a new distribution of sentencing discretion between the
legislature, an administrative board, and the judiciary. Nor is it to
oppose new controls and guides to the exercise of the judicial
sentencing discretion. Important proposals to these ends have
recently been advanced by Senator Kennedy in his bill introduced to
Congress early this year. 43 This bill, which has attracted wide
Congressional support and, it is believed, the support of the
Department of Justice as well, relies heavily on the work of Judge
Marvin E. Frankel of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and on his important book, Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order."4 It also reflects some suggestions I
made in The Future of Imprisonment.15 In presenting the bill to
Congress, Senator Kennedy referred to the compelling data on
sentencing disparity in the federal system and to Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger's comment in his annual year-end report on the
state of the nation's judicial system that "[s]ome form of review
procedure is needed to deal with this dilemma [of sentencing
'46
disparity].
Let me describe the broad outline of the Kennedy Bill in
language used by its sponsor:The bill does the following: First, it establishes for the first time
certain uniform general criteria which all Federal courts must
consider in formulating a sentence for a convicted defendant.
These criteria refer the court generally to the nature of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, the need for just punishment, the need to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant, and the requirement
that the sentence imposed act as a deterrent. These criteria,
uniformly applied, assure that all Federal courts will consider
the same general factors and goals of sentencing.
Second, the bill requires that the court, in sentencing the
defendant to a term of imprisonment, give its reasons for the
43. S. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 406 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977).
44. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 6.
45. See N. MORRIS, supra note 4.
46. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report 7 (Jan. 2, 1977).
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sentence imposed in open court so that the justifications and
reasons underlying the sentence become part of the public record
and can be reviewed by an appellate court.
Third, it marks an important break with tradition by
providing for limited appellate review of sentences. No longer
will the trial court act unilaterally without the possibility of a
judicial check on the exercise of discretion.
Finally, and most importantly, the bill establishes an
independent Federal sentencing commission with a mandate to
promulgate and distribute to all Federal courts suggested
sentencing ranges for specific offenses, guidelines to aid judges
in the sentencing process, and general policy statements relating
to sentencing. The bill also lists various factors to be considered
by the Commission in determining appropriate sentencing
ranges. These factors include such matters as the grade and
circumstances of the offense, the nature and degree of the harm
inflicted, the gravity of the offense, the public concern generated
by the offense, the deterrent effect of the particular sentence, the
current incidence of the offense, the age and mental and
physical condition of the defendant, the criminal history of the
defendant, the defendant's role in the commission of the offense,
and the defendant's degree of dependence upon criminal activity
47
for livelihood.
The Kennedy Bill thus avoids the central error in the von Hirsch
and Dershowitz proposals, incorporated in the Hart-Javits Bill, of
trying to phrase, in relation to the existing statute book, presumptive
sentences which are morally and socially defensible and which
would not be subject to nullification in practice. Judges, quite
properly, will not impose sentences they think are unjust, and they
have ample means of nullifying legislative efforts to coerce them to
do so. Principled sentencing requires a different balance between the
legislature, the administrative board, and the judge than is framed
by the Hart-Javits proposals. The "sentencing ranges," "guidelines,"
and "policy statements" which are the business of the Commission
on Sentencing under the Kennedy Bill are much to be preferred to
the presumptive sentences of the Hart-Javits Bill.
One contentious issue raised by the Kennedy Bill is the extent of
appellate review it will provide. There are those, amongst whom I
count myself, who see sentencing as so central to justice under law,
defining as it does the largest power the State ever assumes over the
citizen, that appellate review seems an obvious necessity and an
obvious precondition of the evolutionary and principled development
of a common law of sentencing. By contrast, there are those who,
47. 123

CONG.

REc. 405 (daily ed. Jan..11, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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seeing the courts, federal and state, grossly overburdened by
criminal matters, regard as irresponsible any suggestion of adding
to the burden and yet further delaying settlement of criminal trials.
Perhaps there is a middle way. One suggestion attracting considerable support is when the judge sentences within the range and
guidelines propounded by the United States Commission on
Sentencing, the sentence should not be subject to appellate review,
other than on the issue whether the case did indeed fall within the
appropriate range and guidelines. On the other hand, if within his
statutory discretion, the judge thinks the recommended range and
guidelines provide an imprecise or insufficient direction to justice
and he therefore sentences either more leniently or more severely
than the range and guidelines provide, that sentence will be subject
to appellate review. If the sentence the judge imposes is more severe
than the range and guidelines provide, the appeal against it may be
taken by the convicted prisoner; if the sentence is on the lenient side
of the range and guidelines, an appeal may be taken by the United
States Attorney.
A system such as this would allow the sentencing commission to
have a long-term formative and unifying effect on criminal
sentences and yet preserve flexibility and provide an incentive for
the essential process of judicial development of common law of
sentencing.
The Kennedy Bill and the Hart-Javits Bill could well come
together in their legislative consideration. The Kennedy Bill is
clearly preferable, since it provides a sounder legislative mandate to
the Commission on Sentencing and the judiciary for their difficult
task of imposing a just sentence on a convicted criminal; the defect
of the Hart-Javits Bill is that it oversimplifies and therefore would
impede the task of moving towards rational and just sentencing.
What is heartening is that both bills at last take seriously and
wrestle responsibly with the proper balance between legislative,
administrative, and judicial discretion in sentencing and struggle to
develop procedures which, over the years, may at last bring
principle, coherence, predicability, and justice to sentencing criminal
offenders.

